

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /016 R

66011
DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: KRSMITH
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: SGOLDSMITH
-----272218Z 002920 /66
O 272103Z MAR 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 5160 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 27 MAR 77

QUOTE S E C R E T CAIRO 5160

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

REF: CAIRO 5157

SUMMARY: IN LONG TALK WITH SADAT AND VP MUBARAK TODAY,
I WENT THROUGH TALKING POINTS AS SUPPLEMENTED BY SECRETARY'S
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS. SADAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY
AND SAID HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO UPCOMING TALKS WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER. HE EMPHASIZED HE IS ENCOURAGED BY
NEW ADMINISTRATION'S ACTIONS AND EMPHASIZED HIS INTENTION
DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAKE TALKS A SUCCESS. IN
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

RESPONSE MY URGING THAT HE COME UP WITH SOME CONCRETE
IDEAS ON HANDLING KEY ISSUES, SADAT STATED HE WILL BE
LOOKING FOR "SOME WAY TO GIVE PRESIDENT CARTER THE
CARDS TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ME PEACE EFFORT."
HE HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR TO ASAD HIS INTENTION TO DO
SO AND HAD TOLD ASAD THAT WHATEVER HE IS ABLE TO DO
SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS "CONCESSIONS"
AS ASAD HAD EARLIER CHARGED IN CONNECTION WITH SINAI II. ON
TERRITORIES AND A PALESTINIAN STATE, HOWEVER, THERE
COULD BE NO "CONCESSIONS". SADAT INDICATED AWARENESS

OF STILL UNRESOLVED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION
ISSUE AND NOTED HE HAD JUST CONCLUDED TALK WITH ARAFAT
AND ABU IYYAD, WHICH HE HOPES WILL ENABLE HIM COME UP WITH SOME
SPECIFIC FORMULAE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE.

HE AVOIDED BEING DRAWN OUT, SAYING HE STILL HAD TO PONDER
WHAT KIND OF FORMULAE MIGHT BE DIVISED. SADAT CONTINUED
TO OPPOSE A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE
PLO, CONTENDING ASAD'S SOLE PURPOSE IS TO VETO EGYPTIAN
MANEUVERABILITY. HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO
ASAD HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE SINGLE DELEGATION CONCEPT AND
CLAIMED HUSSEIN ALSO OPPOSES IT. ON ARMS, I TOLD HIM
THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION IS SENSITIVE TO HIS PROBLEM,
BUT ALSO BELIEVES CAUTION NECESSARY.

IT WOULD NOT HELP EITHE HIM
OR PRESIDENT CARTER IF CONGRESS TURNED DOWN ARMS SALE
REQUEST. THERE IS SOME THINKING IN WASHINGTON
NEVERTHELESS THAT PERHAPS ADDITIONAL C-130'S AND PASSIVE
EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE PROVIDED IF SADAT DEEMS THIS HELPFUL.
SADAT ASKED ABOUT

F5E'S I TOLD HIM THIS AIRCRAFT COMES UNDER HEADING OF
LETHAL EQUIPMENT AND WOULD DOUBTLESS CAUSE PROBLEM.
SADAT SAID HE UNDERSTANDS SITUATION, BUT WILL WANT
TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. ON UNSC
DEBATE, HE SAID THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH FAHMY.
FINALLY, HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS
TO MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS OUR OBJECTIONS TO THEIR SETTLEMENT

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

ACTIVITES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY.

1. MET FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF TODAY WITH PRESIDENT
SADAT AT THE BARRAGES. VP HUSNI MUBARAK WAS ALSO
PRESENT. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE BARRAGES, ARAFAT AND
SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYYAD) WERE MEETING WITH SADAT AND
MUBARAK, BUT PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SENSIBLY TOOK ME TO
ANOTHER ROOM TO ENSURE THAT WE NOT MEET. SUBSTANCE
OF MY TALK WITH SADAT FOLLOWS:

2. UPCOMING VISIT: AFTER WELCOMING ME BACK AND SAYING
I HAD BEEN AWAY A LONG TIME, SADAT INDICATED HE IS
LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS SECOND WASHINGTON TRIP AND THAT FAHMY HAD
BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL ON OUR TALK OF YESTERDAY (REFTEL)
I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS ALSO LOOKING FORWARD TO
HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. AS HE KNEW, PRESIDENT
CARTER WELCOMES THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO SADAT IN
ADVANCE OF THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS IN ORDER TO EXPLORE
IDEAS AND TO SEEK SADAT'S VIEWS AND COUNSEL ON HOW WE
MIGHT BEST PROCEED. THE ROAD TO PEACE IS NOT AN EASY
ONE, BUT PRESIDENT CARTER IS DETERMINED TO DO HIS
UTMOST TO MAKE PROGRESS. IN ORDER TO DO SO, HOWEVER,
HE NEEDS THE CONSTRUCTIVE HELP OF OUR ARAB AND ISRAELI FRIENDS.
SADAT INDICATED HE IS MINDFUL OF THE HONOR OF BEING THE

FIRST ARAB LEADER TO BE INVITED BY PRESIDENT CARTER
AND EMPHASIZED HIS INTENTION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO MAKE THE TALKS A SUCCESS.

3. KEY ISSUES: I THEN TOLD SADAT THAT PRESIDENT
CARTER WILL WANT TO EXPLORE WITH HIM IN DETAIL THE
THREE KEY ISSUES: (A) WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES,
(B) NATURE OF THE PEACE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A
SETTLEMENT AND (C) QUESTION OF A SOLUTION TO THE
PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WANT TO
ELABORATE ON THE IDEAS HE DISCUSSED PUBLICLY ON MARCH 9
AND MARCH 16 ABOUT FINAL BOUNDARIES, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWAL, NORMALIZATION MEASURES IN THE
CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND A HOMELAND
FOR THE PALESTINIANS. I NOTED SECRETARY VANCE HAD
REPORTED FULLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS TALKS WITH
SADAT AND THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WELCOME ANY FURTHER
THOUGHTS PRESIDENT SADAT MAY HAVE DEVELOPED ON HOW TO
TACKLE THESE ISSUES. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE EGYPTIAN SIDE COMING UP WITH SOME CONCRETE IDEAS.

4. SADAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND SAID HE WILL
BE LOOKING FOR "SOME WAY TO GIVE PRESIDENT CARTER THE
NECESSARY CARDS TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE ME
PEACE EFFORT." SADAT RECALLED HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR
TO ASAD THAT HE INTENDS TO DO JUST THAT. HE HAD REMINDED
ASAD OF THE LATTER'S EARLIER ATTACKS ON HIM FOR GRANTING SO CALLED
"CONCESSIONS" AS PART OF SINAI II, E.G., TRANSIT OF
ISRAELI CARGOES THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL, BUT HAD EMPHASIZED TO ASAD
THAT WHATEVER HE, SADAT, MIGHT DO SHOULD NOT BE
VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF "CONCESSIONS". THE IMPERATIVES
OF A ME PEACE DICTATE THE RECOGNITION OF THE REALITIES
OF THE SITUATION. IN MAKING THIS POINT TO ASAD, HE
HAD STRESSED THAT THERE ARE TWO ISSUES ON WHICH THERE
CAN BE NO "CONCESSION", (A) TERRITORY AND (B) A
PALESTINIAN STATE. SADAT THEN RECALLED THE "SECRET"
DECISION TAKEN AT THE RABAT SUMMIT, IN WHICH ARAFAT HAD
ACQUIESSED, THAT THE BORDERS OF A
PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD BE THE 1967 BORDERS. SADAT
DID NOT INDICATE ASAD'S RESPONSE.

5. THE PRESIDENT
ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE UPCOMING
VISIT. ALL SIGNS POINT TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTENTION
TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE ME ISSUE AND TO HANDLE IT IN
A FAIR WAY. THE CANCELLATION OF THE CONCUSSION BOMB
SALE TO ISRAEL, THE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE GULF OF SUEZ
OIL DRILLING PROBLEM, THE PUBLICLY STATED US
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

POSITION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS POLICY ARE ALL GOOD SIGNS AND HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM. HE WILL BE PREPARED TO TALK TO PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT IDEAS ON SOLVING THE VARIOUS KEY ISSUES.

6. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION: I COMMENTED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE PLEASED TO HEAR THIS, BUT NOTED THAT THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE IN TERMS OF RECONVENING GENEVA THIS YEAR IS THE STILL UNRESOLVED MATTER OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. I HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. THE RESULTS OF THE PNC MEETING HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING IN THIS RESPECT. WE HAVE APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT SADAT IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES CREATED BY THE PALESTINIANS POSITION TO THEIR REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA AND WE AGREE THIS IS A MATTER FOR THE ARABS TO DEAL WITH IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. PRESIDENT CARTER, I EMPHASIZED, WILL WANT TO HEAR IN DETAIL SADAT'S LATEST THINKING ON THIS MATTER WHICH, IF NOT RESOLVED SOON, COULD BLOCK THE WHOLE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I NOTED THAT THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS MAY FACE THE QUESTION WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO LET THE PLO FRUSTRATE THE TALKS. PRESIDENT CARTER VERY MUCH HOPES THAT OUT OF HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH SADAT WILL COME SOME CLEAR IDEA OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH SADAT AND THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS WILL WORK TO FIND A SOLUTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTED THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAD FOUND DIVERGENT VIEWS AMONG THE ARAB LEADERS ON THE MATTER OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SADAT WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONCERT WITH ASAD PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE IN ORDER TO PRESENT A COMMON ARAB VIEW. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE.

7. SADAT RECALLED HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH ASAD PRIOR TO THE AFRO-ARAB CONFERENCE. HE HAD
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

AGREED THAT IN THEORY THIS CONCEPT OF A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION IS GOOD IN TERMS OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ASAD, SADAT HAD EMPHASIZED THAT HE DOES NOT CONSIDER A SINGLE DELEGATION (TO INCLUDE THE PLO) AS FEASIBLE. SADAT HAD STRESSED TO ASAD THE DIFFICULTY CREATED BY THE DIVISIONS AMONG THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO SADAT, ASAD HAD ULTIMATELY AGREED THAT A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION WAS NOT POSSIBL. SADAT UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE HIS AGREEMENT, ASAD HAD CONTINUED TO URGE THE IDEA OF SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION WHEN TALKING TO SECRETARY VANCE. SOMETIME LATER SADAT REITERATED THAT HE CANNOT ACCEPT THIS AND CLAIMED THAT

KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO EXPRESSED HIS OBJECTION TO THE CONCEPT. HUSSEIN HAD ARGUED FOR A SEPARATE PLO DELEGATION SINCE, AS HUSSEIN PUT IT, THE PALESTINIANS ARE "TOTALLY UNPREDICTABLE".

8. SHOWING HIS RESIDUAL SUSPICIONS OF ASAD, SADAT OBSERVED THAT ASAD'S PURPOSE IS TO PUT A "VETO" ON GOE FLEXIBILITY. IF THERE IS A SINGLE DELEGATION, SADAT NOTED, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE HEADED BY AN EGYPTIAN SINCE EGYPT ACCOUNTS FOR ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL ARAB POPULATION. ASAD AND OTHERS WILL ASSUREDLY USE THE SINGLE DELEGATION CONCEPT TO LIMIT EGYPT'S MANEUVERABILITY. THIS, SADAT STATED, IS UNACCEPTABLE AND HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO ASAD HIS OBJECTIONS TO A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION.

9. NOTING THAT ARAFAT AND ABU IYYAD HAD JUST BEEN IN TO SEE HIM, SADAT STATED HE HAD JUST DISCUSSED WITH THE TWO FATAH LEADERS THE MATTER OF THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA. ON THE BASIS OF THIS LATEST TALK, HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO PREPARE SOME FORMULAE WHICH MIGHT ASSIST IN RESOLVING THIS ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT ISSUE. I SOUGHT TO DRAW HIM OUT, BUT SADAT SAID HE HAD TO PONDER HIS TALK WITH ARAFAT AND ABU IYYAD BEFORE
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

FORMULATING SPECIFIC IDEAS. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE EXPECTS TO HAVE SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

10. ARMS. RECALLING HIS PERTINENT DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY VANCE, I TOLD SADAT THAT I HAD FOUND GREAT SENSITIVITY IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY SUPPLY SITUATION. I HAD TO TELL HIM IN ALL CANDOR, HOWEVER, THAT I HAD ALSO FOUND A STRONG SENSE OF CAUTION RE THE SALE OF US EQUIPMENT. I RECALLED OUR PREVIOUS TALKS ON THE SUBJECT AND NOTED THAT CONCERN CONTINUES TO BE GREAT THAT, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES, SURFACING THE ISSUE NOW COULD HARM THE GREATLY IMPROVED ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ME ISSUE THAT HAVE RESULTED IN LARG DEGREE FROM SADAT'S OWN STATESMANSHIP. I NOTED THAT THERE IS SOME THINKING IN WASHINGTON THAT PERHAPS SOME ADDITIONAL C-130'S AND PASSIVE EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE PROVIDED, IF SADAT BELIEVES THIS WOULD HELP HIS SITUATION. I STRESSED THAT IT WOULD NOT HELP EITHER HIM OR PRESIDENT CARTER IF AN ARMS SALE REQUEST WERE PUT TO THE CONGRESS AND TURNED DOWN. IN ANY EVENT, PRESIDENT CARTER LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH SADAT.

11. SADAT INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. HE AGREED THAT ANY CONGRESSIONAL TURN DOWN OF AN ARMS

SALE REQUEST FOR EGYPT WOULD HURT HIM AT HOME AND IN THE ME AREA. IT SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED UNLESS WE ARE SURE IT WILL BE APPROVED.

12. HE DID NOT PICK UP MY C-130 COMMENT BUT ASKED ABOUT F5E'S. I TOLD HIM THAT THE F5E COMES UNDER THE HEADING OF LETHAL WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD DOUBTELSS GIVE US REAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CONGRESS. ALLUDING TO SADAT'S RECENT STATEMENT TO THE PRESS THAT THE F5E IS A "TENTH RATE AIRCRAFT," I SAID THAT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT I HAD TO

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

DISAGREE WITH THAT DESCRIPTION. THE F5E IS A FIRST CLASS AIRCRAFT, WHICH BECAUSE OF ITS EXCELLENT MANEUVERABILITY HAS NOW BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE USAF. IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS IT HAS BEE FOUND TO B A MATCH FOR THE PHANTOM. VP MUBARAK, WHO WAS A FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE F5E IS A FIRST CLASS AIRCRAFT. SADAT LAUGHED AND DID NOT PURSUE THE POINT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT HE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ARMS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

13. UNSC DEBATE: I THEN MENTIONED THE CURRENT UNSC DEBATE, EMPHASIZING OUR CONCERN THAT A DIVISIVE UNSC MEETING ON THE EVE OF SADAT'S VISIT WOULD HARDLY BE HELPFUL. SADAT AGREED, BUT SAID THIS WAS NOT A MATTER THAT HE HAS BEEN DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH. I SHOULD DISCUSS IT WITH FAHMY.

14. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS: I TOLD SADAT THAT THE USG REMAINS KEENLY AWARE OF THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE CONTINUED ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THAT WE HAVE AGAIN MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRALIS AT A HIGH LEVEL OUR OPPOSITION TO THIS ISRALI ACTIVITY. SADAT SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS, BUT NOTED THAT DESPITE OUR EFFORTS ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES SEEM TO GO ON. HE WISHED THAT WE COULD TAKE A STRONGER LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THIS MATTER. I TOLD HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OR VIEW OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS CLEAR TO THEM AS NECESSARY. SADAT INDICATED HIS SATISFACTION.

15. COMMENT: SADAT WAS CORDIAL AND RELAXED, BUT LOOKED TIRED. HE IS CLEARLY LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND, IF HE RUNS TRUE TO FORM, WILL DOUBTLESS COME UP WITH SOME IDEAS. THE

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 068034 TOSEC 030026

EGYPTIANS MAY OVERESTIMATE THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE PALESTINIANS, BUT SADAT AT LEAST DESERVES CREDIT FOR TRYING TO INDUCE SOME PALESTINIAN FLEXIBILITY. THIS IS MORE THAN MOST OTHER ARAB LEADERS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO DO. ARMS SALES REMAIN ON HIS MINE, BUT I BELIEVE I HAVE CONDITIONED HIM TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT OUR ABILITY TO HELP IN THIS SENSITIVE SPHERE WILL AT BEST BE LIMITED. AS I WAS LEAVING HE SAID HE WILL LET ME KNOW IF HE HAS ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS THAT HE WISHES CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE ON MARCH 31.

EILTS

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 27-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE068034
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S-O: KRSRSMITH
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770105-0420
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197703111/baaaevnv.tel
Line Count: 341
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 3ba601b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: CAIRO 5157
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2965429
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, EG, US, (SADAT, ANWAR), (EILTS, HERMANN F)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3ba601b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009